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Extraterritorial Application of the First
Amendment to Defamation Claims Against
American Media
I. Introduction
Should the First Amendment attach to all speech that originates
in the United States, or are constitutional protections for expression
shed at the border? State of the art communications technology has
heralded a new international age for media. Instant retransmission of
picture, sound, and data has given rise to exponential growth of trans-
national exchanges of news, entertainment and advertising. With this
explosion of international media comes the increased risk of cross-bor-
der defamation.1 The problem, for example, is that a constitutionally
privileged statement in the United States may be a libel2 in Britain.
The conflict is exacerbated when litigants select forums in ordei to
evade or hide behind the First Amendment.
This substantial conflict between the Constitution and foreign def-
amation law presents a challenge for American courts: When faced
with a case that would otherwise require the application or enforce-
ment of foreign defamation law, should principles of international law
give way to the First Amendment's insulation of the media from defa-
mation liability? When U.S. courts would otherwise apply foreign law,
or enforce foreign judgments, how should First Amendment concerns
be addressed? Although the three modern decisions facing the ques-
tion have resulted in the application of First Amendment protections,
the standards by which each court ruled are not consistent, and in
some instances, they are not even clear.
Defamation suits against the media pit individuals' interests in
their reputations against values underlying freedom of expression.
American constitutional standards resolve this tension strongly in favor
of the latter.3 This policy preference for the press is uniquely Ameri-
I The terms "defamation" and "libel" are used somewhat interchangeably. For the rec-
ord, "[d] efamation is made up of the twin torts libel and slander-the one being, in general,
written, the other spoken." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984).
2 A primafacie case of libel requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant "(1) pub-
lished a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff." KEETON ET
AL., supra note 1, § 113, at 802.
3 See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (stating
that "where the scales [between press freedom and injury to an individual's reputation] are in
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can and is embodied in the First Amendment and the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the speech and press clauses. Whether this
protection follows the U.S. media when it publishes abroad is unset-
tled. Although it is rarely analyzed, the extent to which extraterritorial
defamations receive First Amendment protection is a reflection of a
particular court's construction of the First Amendment.
While courts and commentators are virtually unanimous that the
First Amendment protects expression that is necessary to democratic
self-government, 4 the level of protection for speech that is unrelated to
the political process is quite unsettled. Some would argue that First
Amendment protection should not extend further than that speech
necessary for self-government.5 Others arguing for a more expansive
system of freedom of expression, believe that the First Amendment is,
or should be, a necessary component of human dignity,6 the core of
constitutionally protected liberty,7 essential for self-fulfillment,8 and
the guarantor of dissent as a crucial American cultural symbol.9
Courts that restrict the First Amendment to its self-government func-
tion are suspect of arguments that constitutional speech protections
extend to defamations published abroad, where American self-govern-
ment purposes could not possibly be implicated. 10 Courts that em-
brace a "self-government plus" view of the First Amendment are more
inclined to extend constitutional protections to U.S. publications in
other nations.
Yet, the transnational defamation case law focuses on stock-
phrased choice-of-law tests that are usually reduced to the indetermi-
nacy of asking whether litigants "relied" on First Amendment protec-
tions. Discussions of the scope of First Amendment protection and its
nexus with the choice of a standard for decision is cursory or wholly
absent. Whether or not this omission is intended, it is a flaw. For no
uncertain balance, we believe the Constitution requires us to tip the balance in favor of
protecting true speech").
4 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Rich-
mond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1971); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GovERNMENT (1948); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND Ro-
MANCE (1990); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv.
964 (1978); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971).
5 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 4; Bork, supra note 4.
6 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Classics 1986)
(1859).
7 Baker, supra note 4.
8 EMERSON, supra note 4.
9 SHIFFRIN, supra note 4.
10 Throughout this Comment the term "self-government only" is used to refer in the
aggregate to all theories that advocate restricting First Amendment protection only to expres-
sion concerning self-government functions. The term "self-government plus" is used to refer
in the aggregate to theories that advocate protecting expression beyond that necessary for
self-government.
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matter the test chosen, the decision to apply the First Amendment to
an extraterritorial defamation case will ultimately hinge on a judge's
personal philosophy of the First Amendment.
Part II of this Comment will compare defamation law of the
United States to that of England. United States law evolved from Eng-
lish law. The emergence of First Amendment protections in the
United States without corresponding developments in England, how-
ever, currently allows public figure plaintiffs to recover claims in Eng-
lish courts that would be barred in the United States. Part III will
discuss the extraterritorial application of the First Amendment to defa-
mation cases in the choice-of-law and enforcement of judgment con-
texts. Part IV will analyze three cases in which courts considered the
extraterritorial application of the First Amendment in defamation
cases. Part V will demonstrate that First Amendment theories are di-
vided between those that advance self-government as the exclusive pur-
pose of free expression and those that -advance some form of "self-
government plus." Part VI will demonstrate how a court's acceptance
or rejection of "self-government plus" colors its results in extraterrito-
rial defamation cases and will conclude that reliance on a "self-govern-
ment only" theory, and consequent refusal to extend the First
Amendment beyond U.S. borders, is incorrect.
II. A Comparison of English & American Defamation Law
The problem of applying foreign defamation law to the U.S. me-
dia is brought into focus by comparing English law to U.S. law. It is
particularly relevant to examine English law for two reasons. First,
American defamation law originally derived from English common
law. Second, England and jurisdictions that follow English common
law have become the forum of choice for suits against U.S. media."
A. English Law
Under current English common law, a prima facie libel claim re-
quires the plaintiff to show: (1) that the challenged statement was de-
famatory, that is, that it caused injury to his reputation; (2) that he is
identifiable to others from the context of the statement; I2 and (3) that
defendant published the statement.' 3 Where a statement is libelous
per se,14 plaintiff need not prove actual injury; injury to reputation will
11 Roy Greenslade, Libel Laws Make Us a Laughing Stock, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 11,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
12 A defendant may be liable even though he had no reason to believe that the state-
ment referred to the plaintiff. EIc BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 181-84 (1985).
13 See COLIN DUNCAN & BRIuA NEIL, DEFAMATION 5.01 (1978); see also, Knupffer v.
London Express Newspaper, Ltd., [1944] 1 All E.R. 495 (H.L.) ("The only relevant rule is that
in order to be actionable the defamatory words must be understood to be published of and
concerning the plaintiff.").
14 A statement is a libel per se if it is susceptible of no meaning other than the defama-
tory meaning. In such a case the statement is defamatory as a matter of law, the issue of
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be presumed and damages will be awarded.1 5 Plaintiff need not show
any fault on the part of the defendant unless rebutting a qualified priv-
ilege or seeking punitive damages.
1 6
Truth, or "justification" is a complete defense, but an unsuccess-
ful justification defense may aggravate damages because English law
recognizes that a defendant may be punished for reaffirming the truth
of the defamation.1 7 The public or private status of a plaintiff is irrele-
vant;1 8 so too is the nature of public interest in the challenged expres-
sion. 19 The common law of England is followed by most other
common law jurisdictions.20
B. U.S. Law
Eighteenth century English law provided the rules of decision in
the courts of the American colonies. After independence, the com-
mon law of the colonies became the law of the states. The defamation
action remained substantially unchanged in America until the twenti-
eth century, when some states began to recognize speech protections
for the press under state constitutions and under interpretations of the
federal Constitution.2 1 It was not, however, until 1964 that the
Supreme Court held the First Amendment applicable to the tort of
defamation.
In New York Times v. Sullivan2 2 the Supreme Court first addressed
the fundamental conflict between the common law of defamation and
the values of the First Amendment. The plaintiff, a Montgomery, Ala-
bama commissioner with oversight responsibility for the police depart-
ment, filed a libel action against the New York Times for publishing an
advertisement that criticized the behavior of the Montgomery police
defamatory content does not go to the jury, and injury is presumed. KEETON ET AL., supra
note 1, § 112, at 795-96.
Two types of statements require the plaintiff to prove defamatory meaning. A libel per
quod is a statement that is benign on its face, but when considered in context defames the
plaintiff. In this case the plaintiff must prove the innuendo, i.e., the circumstances that
render the statement defamatory. A statement may also be susceptible of two meanings, one
benign, the other defamatory. In that case, the plaintiff must show that the speaker intended
the defamatory meaning. Id. at 796.
15 BARENDT, supra note 12, at 178. Because of the difficulty of establishing quantifiable
damages for the injury to reputation caused by defamation, the availability of presumed dam-
ages often means the difference between a hollow victory and one in which the plaintiff
actually recovers. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 116A, at 842-43.
16 See DUNCAN & NEILL, supra note 13, 14.01-14.04.
17 DUNCAN & NEILL, supra note 13, ch. 12.
18 Blackshaw v. Lord, [1983] 2 All E.R. 311, 327 (H.L.).
19 Id
20 E.g., Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 674 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting that Indian law has
its roots in English law); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574, 580 (D. Haw. 1979) (noting
that the Pacific island-nation of Nauru follows English law).
21 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 n.20 (1964).
22 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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during civil rights protest activities.23 Under the common law of Ala-
bama, plaintiff won a $500,000 damage award that was upheld by the
Alabama Supreme Court.24 The U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Brennan, reversed, holding the Alabama law to be
unconstitutional.2 5
In reaching its decision, the Court held that the First Amendment
mandates certain minimum protections in all cases where the plaintiff
is a public official seeking to recover under state law in a defamation
action arising from statements concerning his official conduct.26 First,
the plaintiff must prove that the statement was made with " 'actual mal-
ice,' that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not."2 7 Second, actual malice must be proved
with "convincing clarity."28 Third, the scope of appellate review in
challenges to the constitutionality of state defamation law is broadened
to include findings of fact as well as conclusions and application of
law.29
These new constitutional standards amounted to a sweeping rejec-
tion of the common law of most American states, and were premised
on the importance of the role of a free press in American democracy.30
By imposing heightened burdens on public officials who bring defama-
23 Id. at 256-59. Some of the advertisement's allegedly defamatory contents were as
follows:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang 'My Country, 'Tis of Thee' on
the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truckloads
of police armed with.shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College
campus. When the entire student body protested to state authorities by refus-
ing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them
into submission.
Again and again the southern violators have answered Dr. King's peaceful pro-
tests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost kill-
ing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him
seven times... [a]nd now they have charged him with perury....
Id. at 257-58.
24 Id. at 262-64.
25 We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is constitutionally
deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the
press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel ac-
tion brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.
Id. at 264.
26 Id. at 279-80.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 285-86. The convincing clarity standard had been interpreted to require a
greater degree of proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard traditionally ap-
plied in civil actions, but less than the reasonable doubt standard applied in criminal actions.
Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 517 (1984) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
29 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285. "The rule is that we examine for ourselves the state-
ments in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see ... whether they
are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect." Id. (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 335 (1945)).
30 Id. at 269-70.
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tion claims against their critics, the law facilitates the government-mon-
itoring function of the press.31 A contrary rule would prevent criticism
of public officials unless the speaker was sure to a legal certainty that
her statement was true.32 The New York Times protections intend to
prevent the chilling of the press on matters relating to the perform-
ance of public officials because such information is necessary for dem-
ocratic self-government.33 Strengthened press freedoms ensure a well-
informed society because "the right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of au-
thoritative selection."3 4
While acknowledging that expression of some false defamations
will go unpunished, the Court contended that "erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate and.., it must be protected if the freedoms
of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they [need to
survive] ."s
In Gertz v. Robert Welch,36 the Court rejected a rule that would have
extended New York Times to all statements of public concern, regardless
of the public or private status of the plaintiff.3 7 Because state interest
in protecting injuries to reputations of private individuals is stronger
than state interest in protecting public figures, it is constitutionally per-
missible for states to impose any rule of fault short of strict liability for
private plaintiffs' defamation recovery.38 The interest in insulating the
press with New York Times protections is not based solely on the public
interest in the defamatory statement, but on the access to the media
enjoyed by public figures. Such access is not, however, available to pri-
vate figures. Hence, the Court reasoned, a lower standard of liability
31 Id. at 270.
32 "The effect would to be shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources." I& at
266 (internal citations omitted).
33 The [First Amendment] ... was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo-
ple .... The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the se-
curity of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.
I. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) and Stromberg v. Califor-
nia, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931), respectively) (internal citations omitted).
34 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
35 I. at 271-72 (internal citations omitted). In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967), the Court held that New York Times protections extended to suits brought by
public figures, as well as public officials. In so holding it expanded the universe of defama-
tion claims that would impose heightened burdens on plaintiffs.
36 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
37 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), a plurality of the Court
would have extended New York Times principles to any defamation action based on speech of
public concern. This would have replaced the inquiry into plaintiff's status with an analysis
of the nature of the contested statement. It is difficult to conjure up a statement that would
have been reported in mass media that would not be of public concern.
38 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
[VOL. 19
REACH OF THE FiRsT AMENDMENT
was constitutionally permissible. Nonetheless, the award of presumed
and punitive damages still requires a showing of actual malice so long
as the defamation was of public concern.3 9
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,40 the Court fur-
ther extended Gertz's limitations of New York Times. A four member
plurality held that where a private plaintiff's defamation suit is based
on a matter of purely private concern, general and punitive damages
may be awarded on a fault standard less than actual malice. 4 '
Most recently, New York Times protections were expanded and clar-
ified in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.42 In a six to three deci-
sion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that where a
defamation plaintiff, public or private, bases a claim on a statement of
public concern, and the defendant is a media entity, the plaintiff bears
the burden of proving the falsity of the statement.4 3 This holding dis-
placed, once and for all, the long standing common law rule that a
defamation is presumed false. Justice O'Connor summarized the con-
stitutionalization of defamation law:
When the speech is of public concern but the plaintiff is a public offi-
cial or public figure, the Constitution clearly requires the plaintiff to
surmount a much higher barrier before recovering damages from a
media defendant than is raised by the common law. When the speech
is of public concern, but the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Gertz, the
Constitution still supplants the standards of the common law, but the
constitutional requirements are, in at least some of their range, less
forbidding than when the plaintiff is a public figure and the speech is
of public concern.44
m. Extraterritorial Application of the First Amendment
Because of constitutional limitations on defamation liability in the
United States, current American law is substantially antagonistic to for-
eign law. This conflict is solidified in transnational defamation cases
where a plaintiff seeks to apply the law of a foreign nation (usually
England or some other common law nation) and the defendant
presses to apply U.S. law. There are two contexts in which this clash
can occur. In the choice-of-law context, a defamation action is
brought in a U.S. court and foreign publication forces a choice be-
tween the law of a foreign nation and of a U.S. jurisdiction. In the
enforcement of foreign judgments context, a foreign court has already
rendered a judgment under foreign law, and the successful plaintiff
sues to enforce that judgment against the defendant's U.S. assets in a
U.S. court.
9 Id. at 348-49.
40 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
41 Id. at 759-61.
42 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
43 Id at 776-77.
44 Id at 775.
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A. Choice of Law
Choice-of-law issues present complicated problems in defamation
cases. Choice-of-law rules vary in different U.S. jurisdictions and de-
pend on the nature of the cause of action. The traditional, and some-
what antiquated, rule for tort actions is lex loci delicti, 45 which means
that the rule to be applied will be the rule of the place of the wrong.46
The difficulty with applying lex loci in defamation cases is that
there is no way to determine mechanically the place of the wrong. As-
suming the wrong to be "publication," should publication be consid-
ered the jurisdiction where defendant wrote and printed the
defamation? Or should it be considered the jurisdiction where the def-
amation is distributed, causing injury to plaintiffs reputation? What
rule should be applied if the defamation was distributed in multiple
jurisdictions? While lex loci may provide some certainty in physical
injury cases, the complexity of the wrong in defamation cases make the
rule unworkable.
Most contemporary courts have replaced lex loci with more flexi-
ble tests. The "most significant relationship" analysis will parse each
element of the claim and determine which state or nation has the most
significant relationship to each element.47 In a defamation case, for
example, the plaintiffs home state will have the greatest relationship
to the element of identification because it is the place where the great-
est number of persons are likely to know the plaintiff and thus think
less of him as a result of the defendant's statements. Under this test,
the rule of the plaintiffs home state concerning identification would
be applied. The defendant's home state may, however, have the most
significant relationship to the element of fault if the defendant's activi-
ties took place at home. Accordingly, a court applying a "most signifi-
cant relationship" analysis could apply plaintiffs home state rule of
identification and defendant's home state rule of fault in the same
case.
A variation on the "most significant relationship" analysis is the
"interests analysis." 48 The subtle difference is that the interests of the
4 5 Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Substantive Rights of Parties to
a Tort Action Are Governed by the Law of the Place of the Wrong, 29 A.L.R.3d 603 (1970).
46 Id.
47 E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). Section 6 provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions,, will follow a statutory direc-
tive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative inter-
ests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and,
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states and parties are compared to determine which rule should apply. 49
Technically, the comparison should yield the rule of the jurisdiction
with the most significant relationship to each issue in a case.
Another standard is the "place of greatest harm" rule.50 This rule
provides that where a defamatory statement has been communicated
in more than one state, the law of the state where the plaintiff has
suffered the greatest harm should apply.5 1 This rule can be applied in
conjunction with a "most significant relationship" or "interests analy-
sis."52 Because the plaintiff usually suffers her greatest harm in her
home community, this rule almost always results in application of the
law of the plaintiffs home state.
These rules have been applied in defamation cases when the
choice is between the laws of two U.S. states. Because the First Amend-
ment applies in all U.S. jurisdictions, applying any of these rules in the
domestic context will not raise the issue of whether New York Times is to
be applied. However, when the conflict is between the law of a U.S.
jurisdiction and the law of a foreign nation, the rules do not suffi-
ciently address the key constitutional question-whether to apply New
York Times protections.
1. DeRoburt v. Gannett
A U.S. court first considered extraterritorial application of the
First Amendment in DeRoburt v. Gannett.53 Plaintiff, the president of
the island-nation of Nauru, brought a libel suit against the American
publisher of the Pacific Daily News (PD).5 4 DeRoburt's claim arose from
a PD article that reported that he had personally loaned Nauruan
funds to the Marshall Islands in violation of Nauran law. 55
At issue was whether the district court should apply Nauran law.
Because Nauran law is virtually identical to English law,56 DeRoburt's
public status would be irrelevant, and he would not have to prove fault,
meet New York Times's heightened evidentiary burden, nor prove fal-
sity. Furthermore, as the challenged statement alleged a criminal act,
(g) ease in the determination and the application of the law to be applied.
Id.
49 E.g., Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 730 (Cal. 1967).
50 E.g., Hanley v. Tribune Publishing Co., 527 F.2d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1975).
51 Id. For additional information, see RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONFrct OF LAws
§ 150 cmt. e (1971).
52 For discussion of DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574 (D. Haw. 1979), see infra
notes 70-71 and accompanying text. DeRoburt employed an "interests analysis" in conjunction
with a "place of greatest harm" test.
53 83 F.R.D. 574 (D. Haw. 1979).
54 The court noted that the Pacific Daily News is published in Guam, incorporated in
Hawaii, and distributed throughout the Western Pacific, including Nauru. Thus, the Court
properly exercised personal jurisdiction. I& at 575. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1988) (A
corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated and of the state
where it has its principal place of business.).
55 DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 575.
56 Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 675 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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it would constitute a libel per se and entitle DeRoburt to damages with-
out proof of injury.57
The court's choice-of-law analysis began with a discussion of
Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.58 Under Klaxon, a federal court sitting
in diversity is to apply the choice-of-law rule of the forum state.59 The
court noted that Hawaii has no established choice-of-law rule for defa-
mation actions. Consequently, the district court was to apply the rule
"it deem [ed] most likely to be adopted by the Hawaii Supreme Court in
the future."60
Recognizing the difficulties inherent in ascertaining the place of
the wrong, and embracing modern trends, the court rejected lex
loci. 61 Concerned that formulaic application of lex loci would obviate
analysis of the underlying interests of the parties and states involved,
the court developed an approach that combined an "interests" analysis
reinforced with a "place of greatest harm" analysis. 62 Relying on the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (Restatement), the court reasoned
that the policy of the forum state63 and the justified expectations of the
parties64 required the application of Nauran law in conjunction with
the protections of the U.S. Constitution.
The policy of the forum state, that critics of public officials receive
broad protection in their commentary, is inviolable:
The importance of this policy cannot be overstated. It is a principle
fundamental to our system of constitutional democracy 'that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government officials.' To insure the vigorous candid
and unfearing disclosure of information concerning public officials,
the Supreme Court held [in New York Times] that the alleged defamer
of a public official enjoys the constitutional protection of the 'actual
malice' standard [which ultimately extends some protection to false
statements] .65
Next, the court emphasized the impact of the expectations of the
parties and its effect on their conduct. PD published "with the expecta-
tion that [its] freedom of expression [would] be protected in the United
States courts,"66 and consequently it was unrestrained in its criticism of
57 DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 575. See supra note 14.
58 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
59 DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 576.
60 Id. (citations omitted).
61 Id. at 577-78 n. 16. Each party contended that lex loci supported its position. Defend-
ants argued that Guam law, which includes First Amendment protections, should apply be-
cause Guam was the place where publication, the last act necessary to cause liability,
occurred. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that "publication," in the defamation con-
text, is a term of art that refers to communication to a third party. Publication therefore
occurred in Naurti and its law should apply under lex loci. Id. at 577.
62 Id. at 577-81.
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLCIr OF LAws § 6(2)(c) (1971).
64 Id. § 6(2)(d).
65 DeRobur, 83 F.R.D. at 579 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270).
66 Id. at 580.
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a public official. Because "the public policy of the United States re-
quires the application of the First Amendment to libel cases brought in
this country,"67 the court concluded that the parties could justifiably
expect the application of New York Times, but not necessarily the law of
Hawaii or Guam.68
The court relied further on the Restatement and prior Ninth Cir-
cuit law69 to conclude that a "state of greatest harm" analysis would
provide an additional measure by which to examine the interests of the
parties.70 Because DeRoburt was a resident of Nauru and was most
susceptible to injury to reputation there, Nauru was the place of great-
est harm. Accordingly, the law to be applied was the law of Nauru, to
the extent that it did not conflict with the First Amendment.7 1 That is,
Nauran law was to be applied with the fault, falsity and evidentiary stan-
dards of New York Times. Effectively, PD benefitted by the court's rule,
which is similar to that of a generic U.S. jurisdiction.
The court's holding appears to be that when choice-of-law analysis
requires the application of a foreign state's defamation law, and the
defendant published with the justifiable expectation of First Amend-
ment protection, the First Amendment will be read into the law of the
foreign state, affording the defendant as much First Amendment pro-
tection as he would receive if the law of a U.S. state were applied. Be-
cause it is the policy of every U.S. jurisdiction that broad New York Times
protections be afforded to critics of public officials and public figures,
the DeRoburt rule would apply the First Amendment protections virtu-
ally any time that a U.S. publisher is sued for defamation in a U.S.
court. The question that is left open is: Under what circumstances
could a U.S. speaker publish without justifiable expectation of First
Amendment protection. 72
2. Desai v. Hersh
Desai v. Hersh73 stands in subtle contrast to DeRoburt.74 Although
the federal district court appeared to apply First Amendment protec-
67 1&
68 Id.
69 Id. (citing Hanley v. The Tribune Publishing, Co., 527 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1975)).
70 I. It takes a few analytical gymnastics to understand how a court that rejects lex loci
can then turn to the "place of greatest harm." Perhaps the distinction is that lex loci operates
on the fiction that there is one place where plaintiffwas injured. In contrast, "place of great-
est harm" acknowledges that plaintiff may have been injured in multiple places, but ad-
dresses the fact that plaintiff has suffered more in one place than in others. Furthermore,
the court employed "place of greatest harm" in conjunction with an interests analysis, avoid-
ing the arbitrariness of lex loci.
71 Id. at 580-81.
72 For example, would the DeRoburt rule extend to a publisher that is incorporated and
has its principal place of business in a U.S. state, but whose distribution is primarily outside
the U.S.?
73 719 F. Supp. 670, 675 (N.D. Il1. 1989).
74 Desai expressly declines to follow DeRoburt Id. at 675. By adopting a rule that ap-
pears to exempt defendant from liability, see infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text, it
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tions to a suit arising from the defendant's foreign publication, it im-
posed a limiting principle that substantially restricts the extraterritorial
reach of the First Amendment. Plaintiff Moraji Desai, a prominent
politician in India, brought a libel action against Seymour Hersh, the
author of The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House.75
Desai's action was premised on Hersh's allegation that Desai sold
secrets to the CIA while serving as deputy Prime Minister under Indira
Gandhi. Two of Desai's counts alleged violations of Indian libel law.
Like Nauru, India's laws derive from the common law of England. 76
Accordingly, Indian law does not privilege criticism of public officials
and public figures.
Desai's public figure status was conceded, thus the issue before
the court was whether it would be constitutionally permissible to allow
his claims under Indian law to go forward without imposing New York
Times burdens. Recognizing that "the applicability of First Amend-
ment protections to extraterritorial activities is uncertain,"77 the court
sought to develop a rule. DeRoburt, the court noted, was the only case
on point.78
Desai argued that because PD's activities in Nauru were random,
and Hersh's distribution into India deliberate, DeRoburt was distin-
guishable. DeRoburt's injection of New York Times into Nauran law was
premised on PD'sjustifiable expectation that its activities would be sub-
ject to First Amendment protections, whereas Hersh, who was alleged
to have exploited the Indian market purposefully, could not justifiably
expect the Constitution to travel with him.79
The court rejected plaintiff's argument, reasoning that the two
cases were factually indistinguishable.80 Nonetheless, it rejected the
DeRoburt rule.81 Reasoning that the Hawaii court's rule was overinclu-
sive because it would result in application of New York Times protections
in all cases,82 it set out on a tortuous path to explain its new rule, which
achieves the same result as DeRoburt-First Amendment protections apply to a defamation
claim in a U.S. court that arises from an extraterritorial publication.
It is the Desai court's limiting principle that separates it from DeRoburt. Under Desa, if a
defendant is protected by the First Amendment, it is the fortuity of his not having personally
arranged the foreign publication that insures his protection. Although the outcome in Desai
is similar to DeRoburt, the rule portends different outcomes where a writer does not act
through a third party to secure foreign distribution. Under Desai, self-distributing newspaper
defendants would not receive New York Times protections for their extraterritorial distribu-
tion. Under DeRobur, First Amendment protection is secured to extraterritorial publications
because it is the policy of U.S. courts to do so, not because of the technical details of the
writer's business relationship with his publishers. This distinction belies a fundamental dif-
ference in each court's approach to the First Amendment.
75 Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 672.
76 Id. at 674.
77 Id at 675.
78 Id
79Id.
80 Id,
81 Id. at 676.
82 The court explained, "However, given the extensive modifications resulting from the
[VOL. 19
REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
effects precision by applying New York Times only when "the purpose of
the First Amendment will be fostered."8 3
The court examined the rules advanced by each opposing litigant.
Under the defendant's proposed rule, First Amendment protection
would extend in U.S. courts to all extraterritorial publications by all
persons protected by the Constitution.8 4 The court noted that this
rule was identical to the DeRoburt rule.85 The court understood the
rationale of such a standard to be that a high obstacle to defamation
claims would prevent self-censorship by the press. A converse rule
would result in a "chilling" effect, where media would decline to pub-
lish stories critical of public officials and public figures for fear of not
being able to clear the procedural hurdles of defeating a common law
libel action.8 6 Plaintiff's contrary rule was simply that the First Amend-
ment does not apply to extraterritorial publications.8 7
The court rejected the defendant's rule. It reasoned that applica-
tion of the First Amendment hinges on whether the challenged defa-
mation is a matter of public concern in the United States, not on
whether the court hearing the lawsuit is sitting in the United States.88
DeRoburt was criticized for failing to address the interests of foreign
nations and for effectively protecting some publications in the absence
of a First Amendment rationale to do so.89
The court also rejected the plaintiff's rule, reasoning that defer-
ence to the foreign law would, in some instances, chill the flow of in-
formation to the American public.90 Extraterritorial application of the
First Amendment facilitates the flow of information in the United
States when applied to random distribution of U.S. published works to
Americans abroad.91 More importantly, the ease of foreign republica-
tion of U.S. works would mean that an author could be subject to liabil-
ity solely on the basis of the unilateral conduct of a third party who
publishes92 the author's work in a foreign nation.93 Automatic appli-
imposition of [F]irst [A]mendment safeguards, under DeRobur, the ([F]irst [A]mendment) ex-
ceptions swallow up the (foreign law) rule and the equivalent of American defamation law is
applied." Id. at 675.
85 Id. at 676.
84 Id.
85 Id Accordingly, its criticism of the defendant's proposed standard is intertwined
with its criticism of DeRoburt. That is, it evaluates Hersh's argument on the strength of DeR-
oburt's reasoning without considering that other rationales could support such an absolute
standard.
86 In common law actions where the plaintiff need not prove falsity, fault or damages,
the advantage is heavily tipped in favor of the plaintiff. Under such a scheme, if a publisher
had any doubt about its ability to prove legal truth, it would refrain from publishing and
much information would be withheld from the public. This is inconsistent with our demo-
cratic system of self-government.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. See infra notes 173, 271 and accompanying text.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 676-77.
92 "Publication" is a term of art in defamation law that refers to any communication to a
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cation of foreign defamation law to a U.S. publication that is repub-
lished abroad, with or without the author's involvement, would chill
domestic expression concerning matters of public concern.94
The court emphasized that its goals in formulating a rule were to
ensure predictability and to "provide... guidance to speakers in order
to minimize the chilling effect which would result from the threat of
possible application of foreign defamation law."95 To serve these
goals, the court examined two alternative rules. One possible ap-
proach would be case-by-case balancing of the foreign law interests
against the "public concern value," or newsworthiness of the contested
speech.96 The other would be to determine whether a defendant has
purposefully abandoned her First Amendment protections.97 The
court analyzed DeRoburt and Desai's Indian law claims under this rule.
The approach was superficially appealling and would afford protection
to Hersh's book. Its subject-the conduct of foreign affairs by a U.S.
president-is the paradigm of high "public concern value" and is enti-
tled to the highest level of First Amendment protection.98
Yet, the court's analysis of DeRoburt illustrated the dangers of ad
hoc balancing in this circumstance. PD's story concerning the misuse
of funds by a government official in a small pacific island-nation seems
to be of minimal public concern value in the United States.99 The
court contended, however, that without the ability to predict the use to
which such information might be put, it is difficult to assess accurately
its public concern value. For example, the PD story might inform a
decision of whether to grant foreign aid to Nauru or the Marshall Is-
third party. DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574, 577 (D. Haw. 1979). Thus a tourist who
carries a U.S. periodical with her to a foreign nation and leaves it in a hotel lobby has repub-
lished its contents as much as the publisher who ships five thousand copies of the same
periodical in its regular course of business.
93 Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 676-77. This argument recognizes that authors typically enter
into agreements with publishers to sell all or part of the rights to their writings. The pub-
lisher's distribution efforts are beyond the control of the author.
94 The court underscored this point:
Application of . . . foreign defamation law at odds with the [F]irst
(A] mendment could have a tremendous chilling effect. Our world is shrinking
every day as a result of improvements in mass communications and travel. Pub-
lications may be disseminated worldwide in a matter of hours, with or without
the permission of the author or publisher. Indeed, applying plaintiff's sug-
gested rule could have catastrophic implications for the electronic media in
this age of international broadcasting from the United States. The advent of
international popularity of the satellite dish may result in expression originally
intended for domestic or limited extraterritorial publication being published
worldwide, or even extraterrestrially.
Effectively, under plaintiff's suggested rule of law, publishers would be re-
quired to conform to the most restrictive law of defamation, wherever in the
world that may be.
Id. at 677.
95 Id.
96 f&
97 Id. at 680-81.
98 Id at 677.
99 I& at 678.
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lands, rendering it of public concern in the United States. 100
The court noted that its difficulty in ascertaining public concern
value echoed the Supreme Court's own such difficulty.101 In Gertz, the
Supreme Court rejected a public concern test as the standard for ap-
plying New York Times protections. 10 2 In this circumstance, because of
the likelihood that all speech concerning foreign public officials and
public figures would pass the public concern test, the results would be
identical to the DeRoburt rule.10 3 While the law of a foreign country
might be applied, it would be applied along with New York Times pro-
tections. Although this result might ensure predictability, it would
render any inquiry into the foreign country's interest superfluous.104
In this case, Desai's Indian law claims overlaid with New York Times
rules would be redundant to his Illinois law claims, and would be dis-
missed.105 The alternative result is equally unsatisfactory. If the bal-
ance did not tilt toward the First Amendment every time, the
unpredictability of choice-of-law analysis would yield little guidance,
and protected speech would be chilled.10 6 Accordingly, the court re-
jected balancing of public concern value as a means to decide whether
to apply the First Amendment to extraterritorial defamations.10 7
Nonetheless, the court explained, public concern or subject matter
tests are often employed after a plaintiff's public or private status has
been determined.108 The rule it ultimately adopted, in fact, incorpo-
rates a subject matter test:
In instances where the plaintiff is a public official or figure and thus
heightened [F]irst [A]mendment protections, including the 'actual
malice' standard, apply to domestic publication, these same protec-
tions will apply to extraterritorial publication of the same speech
where the speech is a matter of public concern and the publisher has
not intentionally directly published the speech in the foreign country
in a manner consistent with the intention to abandon [F]irst
[A] mendment protections.' 09
Thus, whether the challenged defamation is of public concern is a
threshold inquiry. If the public concern test is passed, the court will
100 Id.
101 1&
102 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 340, 346 (1973). Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, reasoned that ascertaining whether a statement was of public concern was far more
uncertain than ascertaining whether a plaintiff was a public figure. Accordingly, a subject
matter test (for public concern) would yield wildly inconsistent results and such uncertainty
would itself cause a chilling effect. Id.
103 Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 678-79.
104 l1. at 678.
105 1I at 679.
106 1I
107 Id at 678.
108 See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1985) (plaintiff
must prove falsity if defamation is about a matter of public concern); Dun & Bradstreet v.
Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 757-62 (1985) (no liability without fault if defamation is
about a matter of public concern).
109 Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 680-81.
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then look to whether a defendant purposefully abandoned First
Amendment protections.
The court explained the criteria by which a publisher would be
judged to have purposefully abandoned the First Amendment. Inten-
tional publication in a foreign country that is "substantial" will indicate
abandonment of First Amendment protection. n0 If such publication
results from third party actions, only the third party will be deemed to
have abandoned constitutional protections and the author herself will
be immunized. This is the case even where the third party action is
pursuant to a contract with the author."1 Rejecting agency principles
that might be applied to third party republication neutralizes the chil-
ling effect that would result from "fear of sale of the speech to a third
party who would, unbeknownst to the author and domestic publisher,
introduce the speech into a foreign country." 112 The court explained
that "avoiding this chilling effect justifies limiting potential liability
under foreign defamation law to the actual person or entity responsi-
ble for the foreign publication, even where the foreign distribution was a
certainty."113 This analysis is consistent with the New York Times princi-
ple that where there is uncertainty about whether to protect speech or
injury to reputation, the balance must tip in favor of the speaker.114
The plaintiff may, after all, pursue a remedy in the foreign court.115
Applying this rule to Desai's claims, the court first ruled that
Hersh's book was a matter of public concern.116 The court then ex-
plained that although Desai's complaint alleged publication in India,
neither side had submitted evidence concerning Indian publication.
The court stayed its ruling on Desai's motion for summary judgment in
order to allow both sides to submit additional documentation.11 7 Thus
the First Amendment would not apply at trial if Desai were to meet his
evidentiary burden by showing that Hersh "intentionally repub-
lished"118 his book in India, thereby exploiting the Indian market.119
B. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
The other circumstance in which extraterritorial application of
the First Amendment is raised is when a U.S. court is asked to enforce
a defamation judgment rendered in a court of a foreign nation. When
a U.S. court is asked to enforce a judgment rendered in another U.S.
court, it is bound by the constitutional mandate that "Full Faith and
110 Id. at 680.
111 Id.112 Id.j
113 Id. (emphasis added).
114 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1963).
115 Desa, 719 F. Supp. at 680.
116 Id. at 681.
117 M
118 Id. at 679.
119 1&
[VOL. 19
1994] REACH OF THE FIRsT AMENDMENT
Credit shall be given in each State to the ... judicial Proceedings of
every other State." 120 When courts are asked to enforce a judgment
rendered in a non-U.S. court, they are bound only by ambiguous doc-
trines of comity. Generally, a court should exercise its discretion to
enforce foreign judgments out of deference and goodwill for the for-
eign nation, so long as the judgment was rendered in procedures con-
sistent with due process.12'
Further guidance is provided by the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act (UFMJA), which has been enacted in sub-
stantial part by many American jurisdictions. Section 3 of the Act pro-
vides that absent certain exceptions, "[t]he foreign judgment is
enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which
is entitled to full faith and credit."' 22
Section 4 provides for exceptions. Section 4(a) delineates the
mandatory exceptions,' 23 including judgments rendered under proce-
dures incompatible with due process, 12 4 and where the original court
lacked personal125 or subject matter jurisdiction.' 26 Section 4(b) al-
lows discretionary nonenforcement in certain circumstances, 27 in-
cluding those where there has been untimely notice, 128 fraud, 129 a
judgment rendered on a cause of action that violates the public policy
120 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
121 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 98 (1971).
122 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNMON ACr § 3 (1962).
123 Section 4(a) reads:
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if
(1) The judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements
of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Id. § 4(a).
124 Id. § 4(a)(1).
125 Id. § 4(a)(2).
126 Id. § 4(a)(3).
127 Section 4(b) reads:
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not re-
ceive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to
defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment was
based is repugnant to the policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be
settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the for-
eign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the
action.
Id. § 4(b).
128 Id. § 4(b)(1).
129 Id. § 4(b)(2).
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of the state, °30 or on grounds of forum non conveniens. 13 1
The result is that the UFMJA provides for routine enforcement of
foreign judgments, out of comity, so long as minimum standards are
met. Unlike choice of law, enforcement is presumed, the burden of
proving that a judgment should not be enforced rests on the party
challenging the judgment, and analyses of competing interests are ab-
sent.1 32 In defamation cases, the issue is whether a judgment ren-
dered in the absence of constitutional safeguards either comports with
those minimal standards of comity or the Act.
In Bachchan v. India Abroad, 33 the only reported case to consider
the issue, extraterritorial reach of the First Amendment was tested by a
plaintiff who sought to enforce an English libel judgment in a New
York State court. The plaintiff, Ajitabh Bachchan, is the brother and
manager of a widely known Indian movie star and was a friend of the
late prime minister Rajiv Gandhi.13 4 The defendant, India Abroad,
publishes a newspaper that is distributed to the expatriate Indian com-
munity in the United States. It is also published by the defendant's
English subsidiary. Additionally, India Abroad operates a wire service
that transmits stories to a news service in India.1
3 5
Dagens Nyjeter (DN), a Swedish daily newspaper, reported that
Bachchan had been instrumental in transferring illegal kickbacks from
Bofars, a Swedish arms manufacturer, to members of the Indian gov-
ernment in return for India's award of an arms procurement contract
to Bofars.13 6 India Abroad's wire service reported that DN had pub-
lished its story concerning Bachchan. The story was carried by two In-
dian newspapers, copies of which were distributed in England. The
story was also reported in India Abroad's U.S. and U.K. publica-
tions.13 7 Four days later, India Abroad reported Bachchan's denial of
any involvement in the Bofars scandal. 13 8 Approximately one year af-
ter publication, Bachchan commenced suit in the High Court of Jus-
tice in London against India Abroad and DN. DN settled for an
unreported sum of money and issued an apology, saying that it had
been misled by Indian government sources. India Abroad reported
DNs apology, but did not issue an apology of its own.' 3 9 The English
court awarded Bachchan £40,000 in damages for injuries stemming
from the wire service report. Bachchan brought suit in New York State
130 Id. § 4(b)(3).
131 Id. § 4(b)(6).
132 Id. §§ 3, 4.
133 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
134 I at 661.
135 Id
136 Ij
137 Id
138 Id
139 Id at 661-62.
[VOL. 19
REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Supreme Court to enforce his judgment against India Abroad. 140
New York's version of the UFMJA governs the recognition of for-
eign judgments.1 4 1 Both sides relied on the discretionary provision to
support their arguments. India Abroad argued that because Bach-
chan's judgment was rendered under English law, without New York
Times protections, the "cause of action on which the judgment [was]
based is repugnant to the public policy of the state"1 42 and should not
be enforced. Bachchan argued that section 5304(b)'s language sup-
ports enforcement. The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules refers
to "causes of action" that are repugnant to public policy, not judg-
ments 1 4 3 Libel is recognized both in England and in New York state.
It could not, therefore, be argued that the cause of action on which his
judgment was based was contrary to New York's public policy. 144
The court rejected both plaintiff's and defendant's interpretations
of the discretionary provision and grounded its holding in the
mandatory provisions of section 5304 of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules.1 45 The mandatory prohibitions reach judgments that
are rendered in the absence of constitutional safeguards, such as due
process.' 46 Drawing an analogy to the proscription in section 5304(a)
against enforcing judgments rendered in the absence of due process,
the court reasoned that "it is doubtful whether this court has the dis-
cretion to enforce the judgment if the action in which it was rendered
failed to comport with the constitutional standards for adjudicating li-
bel claims. " 147
The issue was, therefore, whether Bachchan's judgment had been
rendered in a manner offensive to the First Amendment. The court
first summarized English law.' 4 8 Any statement that hurts a plaintiffs
reputation is defamatory.1 49 Plaintiff's only burden is to prove that a
defamatory statement refers to him.150 Truth and damages are pre-
sumed.15 1 A defendant may plead the affirmative defense of justifica-
tion, or truth, but if the defense fails, the jury may award additional
damages for the further injury inflicted by the defendant's repetition
of the libel. 15 2
140 Id. at 662. An additional award of£40,000 for the publication of the English edition
of India Abroad was not before the New York court.
141 N.Y. Civ. Pac. L. & R. 5304 (McKinney 1988).
142 Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662 (quoting N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 5304 (McKinney
1988)).
143 Id.
144
145
146 Itj
147 Id
148 Id. at 663. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of English
defamation law.
149 Bachchan, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
150 Id.
151 J&d
152 1d
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The court next summarized the holding of Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps:153 Where a private figure plaintiff brings suit against a
defendant based on a statement of public concern, the common law
presumption of falsity cannot stand, and the burden of proof is placed
on the plaintiff.154 Declining to rule that Bachchan was a public fig-
ure, the court reached its decision by holding that India Abroad's story
was of public concern. Because English law presumes falsity, the Eng-
lish judgment did not comport with Hepps' requirement that plaintiff
prove falsity where the challenged statement is of public concern. The
English judgment was therefore constitutionally unenforceable. 155
The court also discussed a further state law ground on which
Bachchan's judgment was unenforceable. 156 Under New York law,
where a defamation relates to a matter of public concern, even a pri-
vate figure plaintiff may recover only after establishing "by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that the publisher acted in a grossly
irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of
information gathering and disseminating ordinarily followed by re-
sponsible parties. 1 57 That is, New York extends the New York Times
actual malice and elevated evidentiary standards to suits by private
figures where the contested speech is of public concern. 158 The court
thus held that enforcement of Bachchan's English judgment would be
offensive to both the U.S. Constitution and to New York State law.
IV. Analysis of the Extraterritorial Defamation Cases
Comparison of the tests employed by DeRoburt, Desai, and Bach-
chan reveals that there is no coherent approach to applying the First
Amendment to extraterritorial publications. The Desai test asks first,
whether the statement was of public concern, 5 9 and second, whether
the defendant purposefully abandoned his First Amendment protec-
tions.1 60 The first inquiry is answered by employing the Supreme
Court's analysis, as explicated in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,
153 475 U.S. 767 (1986). See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Hepps.
154 Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 663 (citing Hepps, 475 U.S. 767).
155 Id at 663-64.
156 In deciding the case under a separate and independent ground, the court avoided
the possibility of Supreme Court review of its First Amendment ruling. See Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 103742 (1983) (Supreme Court will not review constitutional rulings of state
courts where the decision expressly rests on an adequate and independent state ground).
157 Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 665 (quoting Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc.,
341 N.E.2d 569 (N.Y. 1975)).
158 Ironically, this means that New York has adopted a subject matter test as a threshold
to the actual malice standard. New York's rule extending greater protection for the media
than is guaranteed by the First Amendment is the very standard that was criticized by Desai
and rejected by the Supreme Court in Gertz. See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
159 Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 679 (N.D. Ill. 1989). See supra notes 108-09 and
accompanying text.
160 Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 679. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
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Inc.16 1 The second inquiry is answered by evaluating the extent to
which the defendant exploited a foreign market. 162
Relying on the Restatement's interest analysis, 163 DeRoburt appears
to employ a two part test. The first inquiry determines whether the
relevant policy of the forum state requires that First Amendment pro-
tections apply to the challenged defamation. 164 The second asks
whether the defendant justifiably expects that the First Amendment
will apply to her publication. 165
The Desai court observed that DeRoburt's analysis is an illusory
slam-dunk for the defendant.' 66 It is not only the policies of Guam
and Hawaii that require "critics of public officials and public figures
receive the protection afforded by the [F]irst [A]mendment; 167 this
constitutional standard is the relevant policy of every U.S. jurisdic-
tion. 168 Therefore, the first prong of DeRoburt compels no meaningful
inquiry; the answer will always be that the forum state's policy requires
First Amendment protection. As Desai illustrates, virtually every trans-
national defamatory publication will involve a matter of public con-
cern 169 and will pass DeRoburt's first prong. 170
161 Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 677-79. "[W]e have held that 'whether... speech addresses a
matter of public concern must be determined by [the expressor's] content, form, and context
... as revealed by the whole record.' " Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
In Dun & Bradstreet, the Court held that defamatory information contained in a credit
report was not a matter of public concern and allowed the plaintiff to proceed without hav-
ing to establish actual malice. Id. at 783. Some of the factors the Court relied on were the
fact that the speech was solely in the private interests of a narrow business audience, it was
communicated to only five subscribers, each of whom was bound by contract to keep the
report confidential, and the commercial value of the speech rendered it less likely to be
chilled by incidental state regulation. Id. at 762-63.
162 Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 679-81.
163 DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574, 579 n.20 (D. Haw. 1979) (citing RESTATE
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAws § 6 (1971)).
164 Id. at 579.
165 Id. at 580.
166 "The DeRoburt rule would be over-inclusive, providing predictability at the expense of
a competing interest without furthering [F]irst [A] mendment interests." Desai, 719 F. Supp. at
676.
167 DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 579.
168 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. DeRoburt premised its conclusion that
New York Times protections are the relevant policies of Guam and Hawaii because such protec-
tions are constitutional mandates. DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 580. First Amendment protection
for critics of public officials and public figures would therefore be part of the relevant policy
of all U.S. jurisdictions.
169 [W] hat might appear to be purely a matter of the internal affairs of a foreign
nation, may be newsworthy and of public concern in the United States. As an
example, under the facts in DeRoburt, the internal affairs of Nauru might be a
matter of public concern regarding a decision by the United States to grant
foreign aid to Nauru. Indeed alomost (sic] any account of the affairs of foreign
countries can, through the use of a reason or imagination, touch upon the
affairs of the United States.
Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 678. See.supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
170 Accordingly, the distinction between Desai's public concern inquiry and DeRoburt's
public figure inquiry is significant. Statements of public concern that do not involve public
figures or public officials would still pass Desais first prong. Under DeRoburt, such statements
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The second DeRoburt prong is linked to the preordained inquiry
into the policy of the forum state and is an equally foregone conclu-
sion. The Court reasoned that because the policy of U.S. forums is to
protect expression about public officials and figures, defamation de-
fendants hailed into court in U.S. jurisdictions justifiably expect First
Amendment protection.1 71 Accordingly, as all extraterritorial defama-
tions will satisfy the first prong, they will also pass the second, and re-
ceive protection under New York Times.
It is the second prong of each test that illustrates the dramatic
distinction between Desai and DeRoburt. Desai's "purposeful abandon-
ment" language appears to resemble DeRoburt's 'justifiable expecta-
tions" language. Each court purports to analyze defendants' reliance
interest, effectively asking whether a defendant acted in reliance that
First Amendment protections would attach to the challenged speech.
For DeRoburt, the reliance inquiry is satisfied by the location of the liti-
gation in a U.S. court.172 For Desai, the defendant's reliance is estab-
lished by its restriction of publication to the United States and its
territories. 17 The difference results in two distinct rules. Under
DeRoburt, First Amendment protection will apply whenever an extrater-
ritorial defamation case is litigated in U.S. courts. Under Desai, the
First Amendment will only apply in a case where the defendant has not
"exploited" the foreign market. 174
Faced with analogous issues in the enforcement ofjudgments con-
text, Bachchan simply inquired whether the foreign law sought to be
enforced would pass muster under New York Times.' 75 Without the pre-
tense of an interest analysis, Bachchan achieves the same result in the
enforcement context that DeRoburt does in the choice-of-law context:
would only satisfy the inquiry if it were the law of the forum state to extend some or all First
Amendment protections to alt statements of public concern. See Chapadeau v. Utica Ob-
server-Dispatch, 341 N.E.2d 569 (1975) (Under New York law, actual malice and preponder-
ance of the evidence standards are applied to all defamation actions brought by private
persons against the press where the statement is of public concern.).
171 "[T] his court believes that the public policy of the United States requires the applica-
tion of the First Amendment to libel cases brought in the courts of this country; defendants
in this case therefore justifiably expect constitutional protection of their free expression."
DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 580.
172 Thus, DeRoburt measures the defendant's reliance by examining the plaintiff's behav-
ior in selecting a forum for the litigation.
173 The fallacy of divining a "purposeful" abandonment of the First Amendment by ex-
traterritorial publication lies in the simple fact that a publisher can not know that it is aban-
doning anything unless some act of positive law indicates that such publication is equivalent
to abandonment of protection. Thus Desai's characterization of Hersh's possible Indian pub-
lication as "purposeful abandonment" is post-hoc fiction. As precedent, it is ajudicial choice
of a narrow construction of the First Amendment's scope.
174 See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criteria by
which the Desai court would determine whether a foreign market had been exploited.
175 "The procedures of the English Court will be compared to those which according to
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are constitutionally mandated for suits by
private persons complaining of press publications of public concern." Bachchan v. India
Abroad, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
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In extraterritorial defamation cases, U.S. courts will not apply nor en-
force the law of a foreign nation without additionally applying First
Amendment protections to the law or judgment sought to be applied
or enforced. 176 This is contrasted to the Desai approach, which will
only apply the First Amendment to a publication's public concern im-
pact inside the United States. 177
An explanation for these contradictory rules may be that the dis-
tinction between applying foreign law and enforcing a foreign judg-
ment warrants differing analyses.178 Underlying Desais "purposeful
abandonment" test is an inquiry into the interest of the foreign
state.' 79 This concern is absent in both Bachchan and DeRoburt, whose
rules would never apply nor give effect to foreign law that is less protec-
tive than the constitutional minimum.' 8 0 If, as Desai charges, DeRoburt
is an anomalous choice-of-law decision,' 8s three considerations poten-
tially explain the difference between Desai and Bachchan.
First, there is arguably no need to consider the interest of the for-
eign nation in the enforcement context. Enforcement occurs after a
plaintiff has chosen a forum that applied foreign defamation law with-
out New York Times protections. Accordingly, the interest of the foreign
nation, which would be protected in a choice-of-law context, has al-
ready been adequately protected by the court that rendered the origi-
nal judgment. If this rationale is sound, Bachchan was correct in
applying New York Times without considering the foreign interest, and
Desai was also correct in limiting New York Times by considering the
plaintiffs exploitation of the foreign market. The flaw in this argu-
ment is that the foreign court's consideration of the foreign interest is
hollow protection if its judgment is ultimately unenforceable in a U.S.
court. The interests of the foreign jurisdiction are no less offended if
its judgment is refused effect as if its law is ignored.
Second, a more severe enforcement test prevents abusive selection
of foreign forums by plaintiffs seeking to circumvent the First Amend-
ment. If the Bachchan rule were not applied, and foreign defamation
judgments were enforced in the pro forma manner of other foreign
judgments,18 2 the First Amendment could be circumvented with
176 See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of DeRoburt on this
point, and notes 145-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bachchan.
177 See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of Desai
178 If this is the case, perhaps both Desai and Bachchan were correctly decided and DeR-
oburt is incorrect. Conversely, the distinction between choice of law and enforcement may
not offer sufficient explanation, and either the Desai or the DeRoburt-Bachchan approach is
correct and the other erroneous.
179 "In an extraterritorial context, due regard must be given to foreign nations' interests
in compensating its own citizens for harm to their reputations from defamatory falsehoods."
Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 676 (N.D. I11. 1989).
180 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text for discussion of DeRoburt on this point
and notes 145-48 and accompanying text for discussion of Bachchan.
181 Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 675-76.
182 See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
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alarming regularity. Because most major U.S. publications are rou-
tinely distributed to foreign nations, 183 those publications are gener-
ally subject to suit in those jurisdictions. Consequently, public figures
and officials, whose defamation claims could not survive a motion to
dismiss under the law of any U.S. jurisdiction would be able to win
judgments in foreign nations and enforce those judgments in the
United States, effectively skirting New York Times.184 In the absence of
Bachchan, foreign law can operate to undercut constitutionally guaran-
teed press freedoms.18 5
Third, encouraging foreign plaintiffs to litigate in U.S. courts may
actually be a principled rationale supporting the plaintiff-hostile Bach-
chan rule: When such cases are adjudicated in U.S. courts, there is less
likelihood that the First Amendment will be overlooked or misapplied
by a foreign court. The Desai test explicitly contemplates whether the
First Amendment is applicable, therefore precluding the possibility
that foreign law will be applied without consideration of First Amend-
ment interests. Furthermore, U.S. courts are more experienced in ap-
plying the complicated New York Times doctrinal scheme. 186 Thus
183 For example, Time, Sports Illustrated, People, and Fortune magazines are all circulated
internationally. See Time Warner, Inc. Has Quarterly Loss of $222 Million, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1990, at 3.
184 The ultimate threat is that U.S. public figures will select foreign forums for their
defamation claims against U.S. media. Because the law of England and other common law
jurisdictions offers no special protection to press criticism of public figures and officials, and
presumes defamatory statements to be false and therefore actionable, U.S. plaintiffs would be
entitled to recover under foreign law for injuries to reputation stemming from the foreign
distribution of otherwise protected U.S. publications.
For example, the Village Voice published an article that alleged that ex-President Bush
had participated in illegal arms sales to Iran to finance the guerilla war against the govern-
ment of Nicaragua in violation of federal law. Frank Snepp, GOP Had Secret Channels to Iran,
VILLAGE VOICE, July 23, 1991, at 30. Under New York Times, the Voice is immune from liability
under the law of any U.S. jurisdiction unless Bush can prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the assertion is false, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
(1986), and that the Voice published with actual malice, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Effectively, this bars any potential suit, for the likelihood of proving
falsity is slim, and actual malice even more remote.
The absence of the Bachchan rule would allow the ex-president to circumvent the First
Amendment by merely bringing suit in England on the basis of the Voice's minimal but pur-
poseful distribution overseas. Falsity will be presumed, the Voice would probably avoid the
risk of further liability for trying to prove the truth of such masterfully concealed facts, and
actual malice would be irrelevant to liability. All that Bush would have to do to win an Eng-
lish judgment is show that the Voice published the article. The allegation that he committed a
crime would constitute libel per se occasioning the award of presumed and punitive dam-
ages. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
Without Bachchan, Bush could then bring suit in a New York court and enforce his Eng-
lish judgment against the Voice's property in New York. The New York Times protection of
vigorous criticism of public officials by the press would be illusory.
185 Bachchan is the first reported case to address the issue. Prior to Bachchan, it is likely
that at least a few defendants used U.S. courts to collect routinely on foreign defamation
judgments rendered in the absence of First Amendment protections. See, e.g., Roy Green-
slade, supra note 11.
186 Determinations unique to American law include the public figure status of the plain-
tiff, e.g., Bachchan v. India Abroad, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663-64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992), as well as
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foreign defamation plaintiffs are faced with a choice that keeps New
York Times protections in tact beyond the borders: litigate abroad and
bear a substantial risk of nonenforcement, or litigate in the United
States 187 subject to the First Amendment if it is applicable. 88
The foregoing arguments suggest that the disparity between the
Bachchan and Desai rules is ultimately justified by a preference for U.S.
adjudication of foreign law defamation suits against U.S. defendants to
ensure that the First Amendment is neither circumvented nor misap-
plied. While this rationale sounds correct in the abstract, it makes lit-
tie sense in practice. In Bachchan, the High Court of Justice applied
English law,' 89 and ruled that India Abroad was liable to Bachchan.' 90
When Bachchan brought his judgment to New York for enforcement,
the court did not even inquire into whether the facts of the case war-
ranted First Amendment protections. In New York, the applicability of
New York Times was a foregone conclusion.' 91
In Desai the court held that Indian law, without New York Times
protection, would be applied upon the proper showing that Hersh had
intentionally exploited the Indian market. 192 Had Bachchan brought
suit in a U.S. court that followed Desai, New York Times would have ap-
plied only if India Abroad had not "purposefully abandoned" its First
Amendment protections by exploiting the Indian market.1 93 Yet, this
is exactly what India Abroad did. Its liability in the English suit was
predicated on its sale of the Bachchan story to an Indian news agency.
This is clearly intentional exploitation of the Indian market as contem-
plated by Desai.'94 Under the Desai rule, Bachchan would have suc-
ceeded in litigating and enforcing under Indian law if he had brought
his case in the United States rather than in England.
whether speech is of public concern, e.g., Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 677-78 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
187 Enforcement of U.S. judgments is generally automatic if rendered in the jurisdiction
where the suit is brought; if the judgment of one U.S. state is to be enforced in another U.S.
state, the Full Faith and Credit clause and Uniform Enforcement ofJudgments Act ensures
procedures far more summary than enforcement of judgments rendered in foreign courts.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
188 Of course a third possibility is that foreign plaintiffs will not oppose defendant's re-
quest for the application of U.S. law in foreign suits. Presumably application of U.S. law or
hybrid foreign law with New York Times protections would pass the Bachchan test. This would
still present the danger of misapplication of First Amendment law by inexperienced foreign
courts.
189 It actually applied Indian law, which is derived from and identical to English law.
190 Bahchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
191 Id.
192 Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 680-81 (N.D. II. 1989).
193 Id. The international scandal discussed in India Abroad's story is of public concern
and would satisfy the Desai test's first inquiry. Id. at 677-78 ("alomost [sic] any account of the
affairs of foreign countries can ... touch upon the affairs of the United States.").
194 India Abroad's publication in India is analogous to the example the Desai court cited
to illustrate "purposeful abandonment" of First Amendment protections. "Where publica-
tion in the foreign country is intentional, and the foreign market exploited, it may be fair to
say that the publisher has purposefully abandoned the protections of the [F]irst
[A]mendment." Id. at 679.
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India Abroad's uncontroverted exploitation of the Indian market
was irrelevant to the New York court's application of New York Times to
Bachchan's claim. 195 Desai, therefore, fared better than Bachchan
under differing enforcement and choice-of-law analyses. Desai was re-
warded for bringing his suit in a U.S. court against a defendant whose
actions were analogous and perhaps less culpable than Bachchan's. 196
Thus, with an interrelated Desai-Bachchan scheme governing extraterri-
torial defamation cases, plaintiffs are more likely to enjoy the protec-
tion of foreign law when they litigate in the U.S. courts than when they
litigate in foreign courts.
The First Amendment is not served by a disparate choice-of-law/
enforcement scheme. It is fiction to suggest that Desai circumvented
the First Amendment in any less egregious manner than did India
Abroad. Both defendants were U.S. speakers who published state-
ments that were actionable under foreign law but were privileged
under the U.S. Constitution. India Abroad did not have to pay dam-
ages from its U.S. assets to satisfy its adjudicated liability under foreign
law, while Hersh may have to.
Bachchan imposes an absolute rule: U.S. speakers cannot be held
liable for money damages in the United States for publications that
constitute actionable defamation in foreign nations unless New York
Times protections are applied in the foreign determination of liabil-
ity. 197 The Desai rule is more favorable to foreign law: New York Times
protections will be applied only after examining the level of the for-
eign state's interest in applying its own law as measured by the defend-
ant's exploitation of the foreign market. In reductionist terms the two
rules can be collapsed into one rule that governs the same conduct:
New York Times protections will apply to defamation suits arising from
foreign publications by U.S. speakers only if the liability is established
by a foreign court. That a plaintiff's choice of a foreign forum is the
crucial element in determining whether New York Times protections ap-
ply illustrates that the Desai and Bachchan approaches may be rational-
ized, but that they cannot be reconciled. The more coherent analysis
is that ideological differences concerning the meaning of the First
Amendment pits the Desai court on one side, and the Bachchan and
DeRoburt courts on the other.
V. Values Underlying Freedom of Expression
The First Amendment limits government's' 98 power to regulate
195 Bachchan v. India Abroad, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
196 India Abroad publishes in India as a routine facet of its operation. If Hersh distrib-
uted his book in India, such distribution was of such slight importance that neither party was
able to testify to Indian distribution at trial. Desai 719 F. Supp. at 681.
197 See supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text.
198 Although the language of the First Amendment bars Congress from making laws
abridging speech or press, it is long settled that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
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speech and the press. 199 Read literally, it forbids government from im-
posing any law that curtails free expression. 20 0 It has never been so
construed. 20 1 Rather, when faced with countervailing interests of suffi-
cient magnitude, the First Amendment has given way to certain regula-
tions that curtail free expression. Government regulates speech all the
time. In some instances, the regulation of speech is incidental,2 0 2 in
others it is quite deliberate.2 0 3 In certain instances, the absence of seri-
ous First Amendment implications are beyond challenge. Few would
contend that criminal laws punishing fraud offend the First Amend-
ment. Yet anti-fraud laws that punish false or misleading statements of
fact clearly abridge some freedom to engage in some speech.20 4 It is
simple to conclude, therefore, that there are limitations on the First
Amendment. It is far more difficult to identify any ordered principle
that defines those limits. A preference for narrow constitutional rul-
ings results in an opacity of Supreme Court opinions concerning the
scope of the First Amendment protections. 20 5 Accordingly, theories
First Amendment to limit the state's power as well. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672
(1925) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
199 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964).
200 "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
201 The most vigorous advocate on the Court for an absolutist view of the First Amend-
ment was Justice Black. In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, Black wrote:
I believe that the First. Amendment's unequivocal command that there
shall be no abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the
men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the balancing that was to be done in
this field.
The very object of adopting the First Amendment... was to put the free-
doms protected there completely out of the area of congressional control that
may be attempted through the exercise of precisely those powers that are now
being used to 'balance' the Bill of Rights out of existence.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61-62 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
202 For example, a city ordinance that prohibits placing posters on private and municipal
property is an incidental regulation on expression.
203 E.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (FCC may regulate broadcasting of
speech that is indecent but not obscene.).
204 This same example will hold true in the case of blackmail and extortion.
205 There is a tension that impels courts to discuss often what speech is not protected
when its decision actually extends protection. In New York Times v. United States (the Penta-
gon Papers case), the Court rejected the federal government's request for an injunction
against the publication of classified Pentagon documents pertaining to the Vietnam War, and
reaffirmed a broad rule disfavoring prior restraints. New York Times v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971). In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Brennan outlined where prior
restraints might be permissible:
Our cases . . . have indicated that ... the First Amendment's ban on prior
restraints may be overridden ... only when the Nation "is at war," during which
times "no one would question but that a government might prevent actual ob-
struction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of trans-
ports or the number and location of troops."
Id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931), respectively).
The concern is that a narrowly drawn First Amendment ruling will fail to provide the
certainty of protection necessary to avoid chilling protected speech. Accordingly, the rule of
construction favoring narrow constitutional rulings often succumbs to First Amendment con-
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that underlie the First Amendment and attempt to explain the uni-
verse of its protection are more coherently discussed by commentators.
As a starting point, it is helpful to examine certain values that
courts and commentators have identified as underlying freedom of ex-
pression. In deciding whether to reject or uphold regulation of
speech, courts can identify a relevant value that is offended and reject
regulation. Alternatively, they can determine that the damage to the
values implicated is overcome by the interests furthered by the regula-
tion and uphold it. Because we begin from a presumption that speech
is protected, the latter is often a more difficult proposition.
Some commentators have gone further, and have attempted to
assert theories that group together one or more values to define, with
differing degrees of totality, the scope of the First Amendment.20 6 It is
argued that a unified approach offers consistent results. 20 7 A compel-
ling counter-argument is that incursions into speech freedoms are se-
vere policy choices that are justified only when a court acknowledges
the values compromised and explains why contrary interests should
prevail. It is not consistency that is needed, but rather it is candid dis-
cussion of policy rationales that compel courts, when necessary, to cur-
tail speech. 208
In The System of Freedom of Expression,20 9 Professor Emerson identi-
fied four core values that are relied on to rationalize constitutionally
protected expression: (1) individual self-fulfillment, (2) attainment of
truth, (3) participation in decision making by all members of society
and (4) achievement of balance between stability and change, often
referred to as the safety valve function.2 10
The first value, individual self-fulfillment, recognizes that expres-
sion should be protected in order to develop a "realm of liberty for
self-determined processes of self realization."211 Expression for its own
sake is a necessary condition of human dignity and is therefore of suffi-
cient value to be protected. It need not serve any social function exter-
nal to the speaker to warrant constitutional protection.212
cerns. "[Elrroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and.., must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need to survive.' " New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963)). This tendency toward broad rulings has not, however, led the Court to articu-
late any unifying theory of First Amendment protection.
206 E.g. Baker, supra note 4; Bork, supra note 4; MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 4. There is a
distinction to be made between theories that attempt to explain what courts have done and
those that are aspirational and suggest what courts should do. The former are often at a loss
to divine a unified purpose in First Amendment jurisprudence. The latter, however, fre-
quently offer prescriptive guidelines that will guide First Amendment law within concrete
boundaries.
207 Bork, supra note 4, at 27-28.
208 SMIFFIN, supra note 4, at 44-45, 167-69.
209 EMERSON, supra note 4.
210 Id at 3.
211 Baker, supra note 4, at 991.
212 EMERSON, supra note 4, at 3-6. This value is distinct from the three other values
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The second value, attainment of truth, mirrors what is often re-
ferred to as the "marketplace of ideas"2 13 model of the First Amend-
ment. This value supposes that if all expression is protected, all ideas
will be available for consideration in decision making.2 1 4 In such an
open arena, the "truth" will, by virtue of continual scrutiny, prevail
over less "true" ideas.2 1 5 Truth may also be contained in fragments of
ideas. By allowing all ideas the opportunity to be assessed, the true or
correct components of ideas will be selected, the incorrect compo-
nents discarded, and the truth will be assembled in the process.2 1 6
The third value, participation in decision making, rests on the
principle that the essence of citizenship in democratic society is partici-
pation in change. Therefore, all members of society must be as fully
informed as possible about issues of public concern. This theory ex-
tends beyond the political realm, "[iut embrace[s] the right to partici-
pate in building the whole culture, and include[s] freedom of
expression in religion, literature, art, science, and all areas of human
learning and knowledge."2 1 7 To the extent that expression conveys
information that in any way bears on a citizen's ability to make deci-
sions in a responsible and informed manner, it must be protected.2 18
discussed by Emerson in that it focuses on the speaker, not the listener or society in general.
Nonetheless, the benefits for society are advanced by the value placed on the dignity of each
citizen.
213 Baker, supra note 4, at 968.
214 Id. at 967.
215 Id
216 EMERSON, supra note 4, at 6-7. The marketplace of ideas rationale was first articu-
lated byJohn Stuart Mill. Allowing unfettered expression serves the search for truth because
"[i]f opinion is right, [society is] deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if
wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception of the truth, pro-
duced by its collision with error." MiL, supra note 6, at 76.
The marketplace model owes its introduction into in First Amendment jurisprudence to
Justice Holmes. Assailing the majority's decision to uphold defendant's conviction under
the Espionage Act for distributing leaflets critical of U.S. military intervention in the Russian
Revolution, Holmes wrote:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
As moving as Holmes' rhetoric may be, it is a questionable model for protecting expres-
sion. As Baker observes, the marketplace theory rests on two faulty assumptions. First, it
assumes there is objective truth that is divorced from individual experience. The value of
ideas probably owes more to individual perspective than it does objective "truth." What is
"true" for one consumer in the marketplace of ideas may be antithetical to the interests of
another. BAKER, supra note 4, at 974.
Second, it assumes that ideas will win in the marketplace by virtue of their truthfulness.
Such an assumption fails to consider the possibility that individuals select ideas because the
message is frequently repeated in an appealing manner, favoring those who can purchase the
most access to the marketplace and not because the idea is "true" or "correct." Id at 975-81.
217 EMERSON, supra note 4, at 7.
218 Id. at 6-9. Compared to self-fulfillment, participation in change justifies similarly
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The fourth value, the safety valve, begins with the premise that
where decisions are made through democratic processes, there will in-
evitably be "winning" and "losing" ideas. Proponents of "losing" ideas
will be more inclined to accept peacefully the imposition of opposition
policies if they feel that they have had an opportunity to articulate
their ideas and participate in the decision-making process. Maintain-
ing an open process prevents violence and facilitates peaceful
change. 2 19
Some additions to Emerson's list are warranted. Professor Baker
argues that the First Amendment should protect a wide domain of lib-
erty.220 Broad protection for expression is a core component of lib-
erty, but it is not the whole story.22 1 The First Amendment should
protect a "broad realm of nonviolent, noncoercive activity."22 2 Ac-
cording to Baker, the First Amendment protection should reach be-
yond speech and protect some conduct as well. 223
Professor Blasi advances the "checking value" of the First Amend-
ment.22 4 The power of organized government so dwarfs that of self-
governing citizens, that traditional marketplace of ideas or self-govern-
ment models are no longer salient.225 Instead, it is the role of a power-
ful media, insulated by the First Amendment, to take on the
government when it abuses power so that citizens may exercise "a veto
power to be employed when the decisions of officials pass certain
bounds."226
Professor Bollinger has advanced tolerance as an additional First
Amendment value. 227 Rather than focus on the value of the speech to
broad protection for expression. The distinction is that the focus is on the value of the
expression to society, not the individual.
219 Id at 9-11.
220 Baker, supra note 4.
221 Id. at 991.
222 Id at 990.
223 Id See infra note 244 for a discussion of the relationship of Baker's theory to the self-
fulfillment and self-government values.
224 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J.
521 (1977).
225 Id at 524-25.
226 Id. at 542. The checking value has aspects of a market failure model of the First
Amendment. By vesting the corporate media with great power to inject ideas into the "mar-
ketplace," the media act as a corrective force against government's inordinate power to con-
trol the "marketplace" to serve its own institutional interests.
The result is argued to be a restoration of equilibrium between citizens and government,
with the media putting its clout behind ideas that are consistent with citizens' interests. That
the media is not unified does not undermine Blasi's thesis. It only ensures that a diversity of
ideas will be injected into the "marketplace" by the mass media's power.
A flaw in Blasi's theory is the assumption that the interests of even a diverse mass media
will mirror the interests of individuals. In reality, the media has its own institutional agenda.
It is entirely conceivable that the media could elect (collectively or individually) not to take
on government abuse when it is in their institutional interests but contrary to the interests of
society.
227 LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY- FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH
IN AMERICA (1986).
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be protected, Bollinger suggests that attention should be focused on
both the symbolic attributes of the First Amendment and the danger of
intolerant responses to offensive speech. 228 An important function of
free speech is its impact on "shap[ing] the intellectual character of soci-
ety."229 Therefore broad protection for speech acts as a powerful ex-
ample and catalyst toward fostering a tolerant society.230 Because "the
free speech idea . . . is one of our foremost cultural symbols,"231 its
symbolic power should be used for social benefit.
Professor Shiffrin argues that dissent should be recognized as a
core First Amendment value.23 2 Rejecting the connection between the
First Amendment and self-government, he nonetheless links freedom
of expression to democracy. The image of electoral majority rule that
drives the self-government and marketplace of ideas theories relies on
erroneous conceptions of American democracy. 233 Rather than a sys-
tem that imposes the will of the majority on an unwilling minority, a
more appropriate characterization of our democracy is its acceptance
of the freedom to challenge established institutions, traditions, and val-
ues.23 4 Accordingly, the more appropriate metaphor for freedom of
expression is the dissenter. The central role of the First Amendment
should be "to protect the romantics-those who would break out of
classical forms: the dissenters, the unorthodox, the outcasts."235
Courts assessing restrictions on speech should, therefore, weigh heavily
the dissent value of the speech at issue and afford presumptive protec-
tion to dissent.236
The foregoing discussion is by no means comprehensive, but high-
lights the dominant thought in answer to the question: Why protect
expression? While analyzing every First Amendment decision through
eight or more values is a bit unwieldy, there are unifying themes. In
advancing his liberty model, Baker evaluated Emerson's assessment of
First Amendment values. 237 Although each of the four theories pro-
228 Id. at 7-12.
229 Id. at 104.
230 Id. at 6-11. Bollinger asserts that broad protection of expression "involves a special
act of carving out one area of social interaction for extraordinary self-restraint, the purpose
of which is to develop and demonstrate a social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host
of social encounters." Id. at 10.
231 Id. at 7.
232 SHIFFRIN, supra note 4.
233 The notion of majority rule by an electorate informed by its selection of competing
ideas is undercut by numerous features of American democracy. The Constitution itself be-
lies this concept. If decisions are to be made by representatives that are conduits for major-
ity wishes, what is the role of a constitution that limits government's ability to effect the
majority's will? Is not judicial review itself contrary to majority rule? Id. at 63-68.
234 According to Shiffrin, American Romantic writers, particularly Walt Whitman and
Ralph Waldo Emerson, articulated this core meaning of American democracy and free ex-
pression far more accurately than have courts and legal commentators. SHIFmN, supra note
4.
235 Id. at 5.
236 Id. at 108-09.
237 Baker, supra note 4, at 990.
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ceed from different values and assumptions, Baker argued that they
could ultimately be reduced to two values. The attainment of truth,
safety valve, and participation in change values all serve the ends of
democratic processes. The emphasis on "self" in the self-fulfillment
value requires the definition of a distinct "realm of self-determined
processes of self realization" 238 that is separate from any role the First
Amendment may play in democratic processes. Thus, the First Amend-
ment is driven by two apparent values: self-fulfillment and participa-
tion in democratic change.239 A reductionist examination of Blasi,
Bollinger, and Shiffrin's approaches leads to the conclusion that
checking and tolerance fit fairly well in the participation in change
value, while dissent serves both the participation and self-fulfillment
values.
The point is not, however, to reduce First Amendment theory to
sound bite-sized explanations. Baker's delineation of two tracks of
First Amendment values underscores the basis of fundamental theoret-
ical disagreement about the purpose of protecting expression in the
first place. A list of values that rationalize protection of expression
does not, alone, define the scope of the First Amendment, for it does
not explain what is not protected. While a fair number of Supreme
Court decisions have denied protection to certain expression, no clear
principle can be extracted to explain what speech will, in all cases, fall
outside the First Amendment's ambit.
The commentary is as fractured as is the case law. It is unil-
luminating to look to any theory or aggregation of values as a unifying
explanation of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. 240 It is, however,
useful to look to theory for analysis of the law's inadequacies and
prescriptives for correction. Yet critiques of past decisions and devel-
opment of abstract correctives offer little to explain how the law oper-
ates on the ground. About all that can be said with certainty is that the
Court and most commentators agree that self government is an impor-
tant underlying First Amendment value.
A theme that emerges from the commentary and that is high-
lighted by Baker, 241 is the tension between self-government and self-
fulfillment values. The relationship between these values suggests
three broad conceptions of the First Amendment that at least compart-
mentalize the competing theories. One conception is that the First
Amendment primarily serves the separate values of self-government and
238 Id/. at 991.
239 1&L
240 The Court has explicitly recognized that speech on matters of public concern is at
the heart of the protection. "It is speech on 'matters of public concern that is at the heart of
the First Amendment's protection.'" Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749,
758-59 (1985) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). Yet,
the Court has also recognized that other speech is less central, but protected nonetheless.
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758.
241 Baker, supra note 4, at 991.
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self-fulfillment. While it may be an exercise in generality, it is fair to
characterize the approach of the Supreme Court as recognizing self-
government and self-fulfillment. Although the weight of decisions em-
phasize self-government, 242 there are some decisions that cannot be
rationalized by self-government values and must rely on self-fulfillment
or some variation of "self-government plus." 243
Another conception is that the First Amendment protects speech
necessary to self-fulfillment only. This is somewhat contrary to the
Court's view, but explains some of the commentary. From a results
perspective, this approach is identical to full protection of both self-
government and self-fulfillment speech. It is only the rationale that
differs. Consistent with "self-fulfillment only," speech concerning self-
government is protected in one of several ways. Self-government may
be derivative of self-fulfillment, and thereby protected. Because the
focus is on the speaker and not the social contract, it may be that what
is protected is actually speech that supports the speaker's perception of
her participation in self-government, regardless of any actual contribu-
tion to democratic processes. 244 A "self-fulfillment only" theory might
also regard self-government as irrelevant because it is a fallacious
value.
2 4 5
Finally, the most restrictive conception is that the First amend-
ment protects only speech that directly concerns self-government. Vari-
ations of this theory have been advanced by several commentators,
most notably by political philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn 246 and
later by Judge Robert Bork.247 Because political sovereignty rests with
the people, there must be freedom for "citizen-sovereigns" to criticize
government.248 As with the self-government value, generally, the pur-
242 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983); Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss
Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("[The First Amendment] ... was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.").
243 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993) (holding unconsti-
tutional a city ordinance that prohibited newsracks that distributed free advertising circulars
but did not regulate other newsracks); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
(holding unconstitutional a ban on "dial-a-porn" telephone services); Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a New Hampshire statute that prohibits altera-
tion of license plates as applied to levy criminal sanctions against defendant who obscured
state motto "Live Free or Die," because it offended his religious beliefs).
244 This is, in many respects, a variant on Baker's liberty theory. Baker's discussion of
self-government is in terms of "participation in change." His focus is on individual participa-
tion. "To justify legal obligation, the community must respect individuals as equal, rational
and autonomous moral beings." Baker, supra note 4, at 991. That is, participation effects
self-fulfillment.
245 This is essentially Shiffrin's argument. Because self-government, traditionally de-
fined as electoral majority rule, is a fallacy, freedom of expression is linked to democracy by
reconceptualizing democracy. Advancing the metaphor of the dissenter to shift the core of
First Amendment inquiry to romantic tradition is surely a subset of self-fulfillment.
246 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 4.
247 Bork, supra note 4.
248 "The principle of freedom of speech is . . . a deduction from the basic American
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pose of protecting speech is to facilitate electoral democratic
processes.249 Meiklejohn in his initial writings went further and ar-
gued that protection should be denied for speech that does not bear
on self-government. Meiklejohn urged a sharp division between public
speech, which would be afforded full First Amendment protection, 250
and "private" speech, which could be regulated to the extent allowed
by due process. 25 1 In subsequent writings Meiklejohn ultimately ar-
gued that "public" speech should include a wide range of subject mat-
ter, including literature, art, philosophy, and science, because
decisions in these areas are ultimately expressed at the ballot.252
Judge Bork is partially in accord with Meiklejohn's approach, but
would protect only "speech that is explicitly political." 253 Bork criti-
cizes uncertainty and overinclusiveness in First Amendment jurispru-
dence254 and would instead ground the First Amendment in "neutral
principles."255
Bork extracts his "neutral" principles from the structure of the
Constitution. 25 6 The Constitution constructs a representative democ-
racy that would be meaningless without freedom of speech on political
issues.257 Because the structure of the Constitution demands protec-
tion for no more speech than is necessary to facilitate its governmental
mandates, the First Amendment apparently protects nothing else. 258
This limitation is also desirable because its very definitiveness renders
the First Amendment "fit for enforcement byjudges."259 Protection of
expression concerning art, literature, and other "nonpolitical speech
rests, as does freedom for other valuable forms of behavior, upon the
enlightenment of society and its elected representatives."260 It is the
"self-government only" conception alone that advances sharply defined
limits to the Constitution's protection of expression. The first two con-
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage." ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960).
249 Id. at 48.
250 Id. at 37.
251 Id. at 39. The problem with the Meiklejohn approach, as Shiffrin notes, is that even
if one could determine what is and is not political speech, "[something is seriously amiss with]
a first amendment theory that [provides] absolute protection for political speech... [while]
excluding protection for Shakespeare, Aristotle, and Einstein." SHIFFRIN, supra note 4, at 48.
252 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245
(1961). This modification is suspect. As a means of bringing a broader range of speech
under the First Amendment's umbrella it fails by conditioning protection of literature on its
connection to political issues. If it intends the connection between speech and politics to be
metaphoric and protect broadly, it becomes difficult to define speech that is not political.
253 Bork, supra note 4, at 29.
254 Id. at 20-21.
255 Id. at 23.
256 Id at 21. Bork rejects the intent of the Framers of the Constitution as broad and
incoherent and the absolute terms of the text as unworkable. Id. at 21-22.
257 Id. at 23.
258 Id.
259 Id
260 Id. at 28.
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ceptions may be considered as alternative formulations of the more
flexible "self-government plus" approach.
The flashpoint that underscores every First Amendment decision is
whether and how far beyond self-government speech protection ought
to extend. 26' Paradoxically, few courts reveal the theoretical assump-
tions underlying their First Amendment decisions. Yet such assump-
tions are crucially outcome-determinative, as virtually every case would
reach a different result were the court's theoretical underpinnings al-
tered. Decisions such as Desai and DeRoburt that are factually indistin-
guishable, 262  yet differently decided, often turn on unstated
theoretical differences. Accordingly, it is useful to examine these cases
through the filter of competing First Amendment theories.
VI. Conclusion
The choice of self-government, self-fulfillment, or both as defining
principle helps explain the results of the extraterritorial defamation
cases. DeRoburt, Desai, and Bachchan all agree that self-government is
an important, perhaps even the primary, First Amendment value.
Desai, however, is deceptive in its use of the self-government value as a
limiting principle.263 It is quite a leap from the premise that speech
concerning self-government is protected to Desai's conclusion that
speech that does not concern self-government is not protected. In fact,
it is a logical fallacy. Desai first asserts that its rule will apply the First
Amendment in extraterritorial defamation cases when "the purpose [s]
of the [F]irst [A]mendment will be fostered."264 It recites precedent
that supports the position that self-government is a widely accepted
First Amendment value. 265 It then concludes that protected political
speech loses its protection once a defendant deliberately chooses to
publish in a foreign country.2 66 Desai characterizes such foreign publi-
cation as "abandonment" of First Amendment protections, 267 but does
not explain why intentional publication is equivalent to abandonment.
In fact, the court suggests that this conclusion is obvious. 268
261 No absolute theory explains all First Amendment results. A court that proceeds
from "self-government only" assumptions will not necessarily afford protection for all speech
that concerns self-government. Neither will a court that relies on self-fulfillment assump-
tions protect al speech that furthers self-fulfillment. Disparate philosophies will merely ra-
tionalize different results and will often be the hidden explanation for seemingly inconsistent
decisions.
262 Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 675 (N.D. 11. 1989).
263 Id. at 676.
264 Id
265 "[T]he Constitution 'contemplates a bias toward unfettered speech at the expense,
perhaps, of compensation for harm to reputation, at least where a public figure and a topic
of enormous public interest, going to the heart of political discourse, is concerned.' " Id. at 677
(quoting Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d. 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1976)) (emphasis added).
266 Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 679.
267 Id.
268 "When publication in the foreign country is intentional, and the foreign market ex-
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That foreign publication by a U.S. author is tantamount to aban-
doning the First Amendment must surely come as a surprise to the
large number of writers, publishers, and broadcasters who deliver their
work overseas each day. The conclusion is, however, obvious if there is
agreement that the First Amendment protects only speech that bears
on self-government in the United States.269 If so, political speech that
reaches non-U.S. readers has no effect on electoral processes in the
United States. It is, however, erroneous to assert that the First Amend-
ment operates this narrowly.270 If the Desai court had been driven by
any type of "self-government plus" theory, the answer would not have
been at all obvious. Desai plays bait and switch with the self-govern-
ment value. It relies on a widely accepted premise-that self govern-
ment is an important First Amendment rationale-and then tells us
that it is the only rationale. In so doing, it hides its adoption of a se-
verely narrow definition of the scope of the First Amendment.271
DeRoburt, too, is disingenuous in its discussion of First Amendment
theory. It predicates its protection of PD's extraterritorial publication
into the self-government value.2 72 Yet, its analysis begs the question.
It may be the policy of Hawaii to protect criticism of public officials
and public figures because it is a "principle fundamental to our system
of constitutional democracy."273 It is not at all clear without further
explanation, however, that protection of such criticism beyond U.S.
borders has anything to do with our system of constitutional
democracy.
Bachchan is similarly opaque concerning its view of the First
Amendment's purpose. While it expresses an aversion to "chilling true
ploited, it may be fair to say that the publisher has abandoned the protections of the [F]irst
[A]mendment."Id. The court never even suggests why it is fair to conclude abandonment.
269 There is a circular aspect to Desai's logic. If abandonment of the First Amendment is
the obvious result of foreign publication it can only be so if a court has judged it to be so.
Desai announces a precedent setting rule and then asserts that the defendant should have
had the prescience to know the rule it would apply.
270 New York Times quite obviously relies on the theory espoused by Meiklejohn to hold
criticism of public officials constitutionally privileged. See supra note 33. See also, SHIFFRiN,
supra note 4, at 49-52.
New York Times, however, expressed no approval of the exclusivity of Meiklejohn's ration-
ale for protecting speech.
271 Desai criticizes DeRoburt as overinclusive because it extends protection to expression
that is not within the First Amendment's ambit. Presumably, the Desai court's reference is to
extraterritorial publications. DeRoburt is overinclusive only if First Amendment protection is
limited to speech that remains in the United States. The proposition that the First Amend-
ment is limited to domestic speech is a conclusion that has been reached by one court-
Desai. Therefore, Desai's criticism of DeRoburt is circular and misplaced.
272 "The importance of [protecting criticism of public officials and public figures] cannot
be overstated. It is a principle fundamental to our system of constitutional democracy 'that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open and that it may include
vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasant attacks on government and public officials.' "
DeRoburt v. Gannet Co., 83 F.R.D. 574, 579 (1979) (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
273 DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 579.
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speech on matters of public concern,"2 74 it does not modify "public" by
geographical limits. Of course, "public concern" rhetoric is closely as-
sociated with self-government values and the court's recitation of this
language invokes the underlying theory.2 75 Yet, the court's protection
of India Abroad's Indian publications does little to foster self-govern-
ment.276 Although it is impossible to divine a rationalizing principle,
it is fair to conclude that the Bachchan court's conception of the First
Amendment exceeds "self-government only."
The "self-government only" approach is clearly not the law. At
best it is a misguided attempt to inject artificial certainty into an area
of constitutional interpretation that is justifiably complex. At worst, it
is a cynical manipulation of constitutional theory that is calculated to
restrict judicial review under the Bill of Rights. A survey of Supreme
Court decisions underscores the conclusion that "self-government
plus" is the correct approach. Although it is not at all clear what is
encompassed within the "plus," protection for advertising,277 art, litera-
ture, and even pornography278 definitively establish the First Amend-
ment's reach beyond speech that facilitates political decision making.
Because their holdings are consistent with "self-government plus,"
DeRoburt and Bachchan were decided correctly. Nonetheless, each
court rationalized its decision on self-government rhetoric that was in-
applicable to speech published outside the United States. While it
would have been more satisfying for each court to explain its concep-
tion of the First Amendment, the results are nonetheless unassailable,
even if the reasoning is flawed. Conversely, Desai falls outside First
Amendment norms. Not only is it dishonest in manipulating the self-
government value to rationalize the wrong result, it advanced, at least
implicitly, a dangerously limiting conception of the First Amendment.
Whether to extend the First Amendment to extraterritorial publi-
cations underscores the idea that the First Amendment has limits that
must, at times, be chosen. Most articulated "self-government plus" the-
ories would seem to extend to extraterritorial speech. Protection
274 Bachchan v. India Abroad, 585 N.Y.S.2d. 661, 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
275 The link between self-government and speech of public concern is illustrated in Dun
& Bradstreet:
It is speech on matters of public concern that is at the heart of the First Amend-
ment's protection .... [T] his special concern for speech on public issues is no
mystery: The First Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 757-59 (1985).
276 Unless the court meant to facilitate self-government in India-a doubtful proposi-
tion. Even more remote is the possibility that the New York court was motivated by the needs
of the American expatriate community living in India.
277 E.g., City of Cincinnatti v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
278 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (First Amendment protection extends to
all speech of serious literary, artistic, political and scientific value.); Roth v. United States 354
U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) ("All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance...
have the full protedtion of the [First Amendment] guarantees.").
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seems to be embraced by the self-fulfillment rationale. An author's act
of making a worldwide statement bears on the author and may or may
not implicate self-government. More specifically, it is encompassed by
the liberty theory equally as a self-fulfilling act that is neither violent
nor coercive.2 79 It is also embraced by a focus on dissent value.280 An
extraterritorial defamation serves as no less an outlet for dissent than
does a domestic defamation.281
When courts decide to apply or deny First Amendment protec-
tion, they are necessarily driven by a theoretical model of the First
Amendment-whether they explain it or not. It is acceptable for a
court to extend First Amendment protection without a detailed expla-
nation about why it is doing so because this is consistent with the gen-
eral constitutional presumption that expression is protected. While
DeRoburt and Bachchan may be less satisfying analytically, they reached
the correct result. On the other hand, when a court limits the First
Amendment, its obligation to explain itself is heightened. It is not in-
conceivable that a "self-government plus" theory would exclude extra-
territorial protection in some circumstances. If so, it should be fully
explained. It is more logical, however, to construe even a flexible con-
ception of "self-government plus" as presumptively protecting extrater-
ritorial speech. Accordingly, courts should refuse to apply foreign
defamation law without First Amendment safeguards and should re-
fuse enforcement of foreign defamation judgments rendered in the
absence of First Amendment protections.
JEFF SANDERS
279 Baker, supra note 4. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text for an explana-
tion of the liberty model.
280 See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text for an explanation Shiffrin's concep-
tion of the dissent value.
281 The aftermath of the Tiananmen Square rebellion and its violent suppression illus-
trates this point. A network of dissidents, both inside and outside of China, have relied on
faxes and electronic mail to communicate about the political situation in China and organize
measures in response. D.D. Guttenplan, Queens' China Connection; Expelled Dissident Runs Tac-
tics Network, N.Y. NEws)AY, June 6, 1989, at 4. This international, instantaneous electronic
form of communication likely carries a number of defamations. It is also an important
means of dissent for many who fall within the First Amendment's protection.
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